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Abstract 
Several researchers have reported that learning a particular categorization leads to 
compatible changes in the similarity structure of the categorized stimuli. The purpose 
of this study is to examine whether different category structures may lead to greater or 
less corresponding similarity change. We created six category structures and 
examined changes in similarity within categories or between categories, as a result of 
categorization, in between-participant conditions. The best supported hypothesis was 
that the ease of learning a categorization affects change in within categories 
similarity, so that greater (within categories) similarity change was observed for 
category structures which were harder to learn.  
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There is widespread evidence that learning to categorize stimuli in a particular way 
leads to corresponding changes in the similarity structure of the stimuli (for brevity, 
we will henceforth refer to such changes just as ‘similarity changes’). For example, 
Goldstone (1994) found increased perceptual sensitivity for schematic, meaningless 
stimuli categorized in different categories and, in some cases, decreased perceptual 
sensitivity for stimuli categorized in the same category. Schyns, Goldstone, and 
Thibaut (1997) argued that category learning can lead to the development of new 
features, which may alter the similarity of the categorized items. Introducing a 
category boundary in a continuum of stimulus variation often results in enhanced 
discriminability on either side of the boundary (Harnad, 1987). Some researchers have 
reported differences in color perception across linguistically different communities, 
and this is another facet of the influence of categories on similarity (Roberson et al., 
2005). There have been several reports of broadly analogous effects, across diverse 
category learning paradigms (e.g., Gureckis & Goldstone, 2008; Goldstone & 
Steyvers, 2001; Lupyan, 2012; Ozgen & Davies, 2002; Schyns & Oliva, 1999; 
Stevenage, 1998) and even in the animal cognition literature (e.g., Delamater, 1998, 
2012).  
 Such research has flourished for several reasons. It is theoretically important, 
since it is at the heart of answering core issues regarding representation and the 
processing of sensory input. Does the cognitive system aim to construct a faithful 
representation of sensory input? Or does it aim for representations, which achieve a 
compromise between information from sensory input and functional considerations 
relating to representation/ categorization? Moreover, do the factors which moderate 
similarity change also influence the kind of feature transfer effects, identified by 
Goldstone (1995)? He reported that, e.g., stimuli assigned to a category of 
Similarity changes  4 
predominantly blue objects were perceived as more blue than they were really were. 
This finding has clear applications in practical domains (e.g., prejudice and social 
stereotyping). 
Understanding the nature of similarity changes is also relevant to formal 
models of categorization. Exemplar and prototype models both employ a 
sophisticated computational machinery for altering the representation of the studied 
stimuli, to accommodate requirements from the learned categorizations (Minda & 
Smith, 2001; Nosofsky, 1984). From such models, we know that, if the required 
classification assumes one stimulus dimension to be more diagnostic than others, then 
there would be increased attentional weight for this dimension. However, this 
research does not discriminate between the possibilities that such changes are changes 
in the representation of the stimuli or are simply moderators of stimulus information 
at the point of classification decisions. The latter appears the standard assumption, 
with stimulus representations implied static throughout the categorization process (see 
Pothos and Wills, 2011, for a comprehensive overview). 
 There has been controversy regarding the exact nature of similarity changes as 
a result of categorization. For example, it is possible that categorizing stimuli in a 
certain way does not alter our perception of the stimuli but, rather, makes certain 
stimuli more or less similar because of the augmentation of the stimulus 
representations with an additional feature corresponding to category labels (e.g., 
Goldstone, Lippa, Shiffrin, 2001; McMurray et al., in press; Roberson & Davidoff, 
2000; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). However, if across broadly matched categorization 
conditions, we find that in some conditions there are corresponding similarity 
changes, but in other ones there are not, then one can make the additional step of 
inferring similarity changes over and above changes due to just the category label (see 
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also Roberson et al., 2007). It is an interesting issue to explore which part of similarity 
change is due to the linguistic label and which due to other aspects of stimulus 
representation, but one which we reserve for future work.   
There is very little prior work on the factors which make it more or less likely 
to observe similarity changes (Folstein, Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2010; Freedman, 
Riesenhuber, Poggio, & Miller, 2003; Jiang, Bradley, Rini, Zeffiro, Vanmeter, & 
Riesenhuber, 2007; Livingston, Andrews, & Harnad, 1998). Folstein et al. (2010) 
wanted to understand why Jiang et al. (2007; see also Freedman et al., 2003) failed to 
observe any changes of similarity as a result of categorization, even after extensive 
successful training. They observed that the nature of the underlying stimulus space in 
the case of Jiang et al. (2007) was more complex than that of, e.g., Goldstone (1994) 
and they argued that it is this additional complexity which prevented the emergence of 
the anticipated similarity effects (complexity related to whether the stimulus space 
was equivalent to a standard two-dimensional coordinate space or, rather, had a more 
complex form). Folstein at al. (2010) supported their argument by creating matched 
experiments which differed only in terms of the nature of the underlying stimulus 
space and finding effects of categorization on similarity only when the stimulus space 
was simpler. The idea that complexity and difficulty, broadly defined, can impact on 
similarity change appears in Livingston et al. (1998) as well. These investigators 
looked at more and less well separated categories, and reported that similarity changes 
were equivalent.  
Such research is indicative, though not conclusive. First, similarity change is 
clearly not a unitary concept, but rather it can be defined in different ways. Work on 
categorical perception (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Harnad, 1987) explored similarity 
change in terms of compression (acquired equivalence) and expansion measures 
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(acquired distinctiveness; such measures have been popular in the corresponding 
animal learning literature as well, e.g., Delamater, 1998). But, categorical perception 
studies typically concern the impact of introducing a category boundary within a 
uniform stimulus space (i.e., in a stimulus space whereby the stimuli do not naturally 
cluster into categories). By contrast, we are presently more interested in putative 
similarity changes, when participants are taught to categorize stimuli which are well-
clustered (to varying degrees) with respect to specific categories. Similarity change 
consistent with a taught classification could be reflected either in the stimuli within a 
category becoming more similar (henceforth within similarity change) or the stimuli 
between categories becoming less similar (henceforth between similarity change). 
Such measures are clearly analogous with those of compression and expansion. 
Moreover, they are consistent with the bulk of theoretical work in unsupervised 
categorization, which emphasizes the relevance of within and between category 
similarity as determinants of category structure (e.g., Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004; 
Pothos & Chater, 2002; Pothos & Bailey, 2009; Rosch & Mervis, 1975).  
When considering the issue of similarity change for well-clustered category 
structures, we can recognize that some are more intuitive than others. Category 
intuitiveness characterizes a category structure and corresponds to the extent to which 
the category structure is natural, obvious, and likely to be spontaneously generated by 
participants (Pothos & Chater, 2002; Pothos et al., 2011; see also Feldman 2000, 
Shepard et al., 1961). Moreover, category structures which are more intuitive than 
others will be easier to learn as well, if one discounts the extra memory burden of 
keeping track of several category labels (Pothos et al., 2012). This consideration is 
important, as similarity change is typically (and also in the present study) studied as a 
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result of learning a categorization, rather than the spontaneous generation of a 
category.  
The consideration of category intuitiveness/ difficulty can lead to the first 
hypothesis of when we are more likely to observe similarity change. Learning a more 
difficult category structure requires a greater cognitive effort. As the learner is faced 
with a harder task in identifying the intended categorizations of the relevant stimuli, 
so it perhaps becomes more likely that the stimulus representations may be elaborated 
in a way which supports the intended categorizations. But in what way? Some 
researchers have reported that different category learning tasks lead to the 
development of different category information. For example, classification learning 
appears to encourage emphasis on diagnostic features and training via feature 
inference tasks emphasis on prototypical features (Chin-Parker & Ross, 2004; 
Markman & Ross, 2003). The analogies between such research and the present 
empirical questions are somewhat tenuous. Nevertheless, we can perhaps motivate the 
idea that, where the category boundary is relatively easy to extract, any elaborative 
processes which contribute to category change will concern within category 
similarity, otherwise between category similarity would be expected. The simplest 
operational measure of category intuitiveness is learning difficulty, e.g., number of 
trials or errors to criterion, and it is this approach we adopt presently.  
In sum, our first hypothesis is that greater category difficulty leads to greater 
similarity change (perhaps more so within category similarity change, for category 
structures for which a category boundary is easily extracted). Note that there are many 
models which make predictions of whether a category structure is more or less 
intuitive, but, in simple cases, this can be established by inspection. We employed 
category boundaries aligned to one of the dimensions of physical variation. Then, 
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clusters of stimuli intended for different categories could be closer or further away 
from each other, thus increasing or decreasing category difficulty (cf. Livingston et 
al., 1998). Corresponding easy and difficult category structures could thus be 
specified which are directly equivalent, in that the category boundary would have the 
same shape and be specified in terms of the same physical dimension. Specifically, 
consider the category structures labeled as Width Easy, Width Difficult, in Figure 1. 
These are two highly matched category structures, but such that the relevant 
categories are well-separated in one case (Width Easy; an easy category structure) and 
poorly separated in the other (Width Difficult; a difficult category structure). The 
Height Easy, Height Difficult category structures are exactly analogous and simply 
counterbalance the physical dimension along which the category boundary is 
specified.  
 The issue of category structure is multifaceted and, plausibly, cannot be 
resolved just by considering category difficulty. Several researchers have presented 
arguments for why certain kinds of category structures may be processed in 
qualitatively different ways, even if overall category difficulty can be in principle 
equated. For example, according to the COVIS model of categorization (Ashby & Ell, 
2002; Ashby et al., 1999; Ashby, Queller, & Berretty, 1999), category boundaries 
aligned to a dimension of variation elicit learning processes distinct from ones which 
are not (e.g., Height or Width category structures vs. diagonal ones, as in Figure 1). In 
the former case, a hypothesis-testing learning process is likely to lead fairly quickly to 
explicit knowledge of the appropriate category boundary, which can then be applied 
to classify all stimuli, while in the latter case a passive mode of learning is more likely 
to be adopted. It is possible that such differences in the learning process may impact 
on the degree of similarity change.  
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Another relevant consideration concerns whether it is possible to specify a 
linear category boundary for a category structure or not. The latter category structures 
are called non-linearly separable (NLS) and are significant in categorization theory, 
because they are consistent with one influential approach to categorization (exemplar 
theory) but not another (prototype theory; Pothos, Chater, & Stewart, 2004; Ruts, 
Storms, & Hampton, 2004). It is currently still an issue of controversy whether NLS 
category structures are harder to learn than matched linearly separable ones (e.g., 
Blair & Homa, 2001; Pothos & Bailey, 2009; Smith, Murray, & Minda, 
1997;Yamauchi, Love, & Markman, 2002). Moreover, linear separability is an 
important constraint in connectionist modeling as well, as NLS problems have to be 
transformed into linearly separable ones at their hidden layer, otherwise learning is 
not possible (indeed, the inability of perceptrons to learn NLS category structures has 
been at the heart of the famous critique of Minsky & Papert, 1969; see also Rumelhart 
& McClelland, 1986). If the cognitive system shares processing constraints with 
connectionist systems, maybe it would try to re-represent a NLS classification in an 
LS way, so that there would be more similarity change in learning an NLS 
classification, compared to an LS one. 
It should now be clear that, over and above category difficulty, there are other 
considerations which may impact on the cognitive processes for learning of a 
categorization and, possibly, corresponding similarity changes. Therefore, a second 
(more exploratory) hypothesis corresponds to whether similarity change will be 
different for category structures, broadly matched for difficulty, but differing in terms 
of whether the category boundary is aligned with a dimension of physical variation, is 
diagonal, or the categorization is NLS (Figure 1). Note that, regarding the diagonal 
category structure, we tested two category structures, one with the boundary sloping 
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upwards (Diagonal A, as shown in Figure 1) and another with the boundary sloping 
downwards (Diagonal B).  
 
-----------------------FIGURE 1----------------------- 
 
Experimental investigation 
Participants and Design  
We recruited 219 experimentally naïve participants, all Swansea University 
students, mostly in the Psychology Department. Participants were predominantly 
(approximately 80%) females of university age. The experiment lasted approximately 
50 minutes for the experimental groups and 30 minutes for the control groups. All 
participants received course credit for their participation.  
 There were 139 participants experimental group participants, with 
approximately 20 in each of the seven (between-participant) experimental conditions. 
Each condition corresponded to asking participants to learn one of the category 
structures in Figure 1 (accordingly, the conditions are labeled as Width Easy, Width 
Difficult, Height Easy, Height Difficult, and NLS; the diagonal category structure in 
Figure 1 will be called Diagonal A and the matched one with a sloping downwards 
category boundary Diagonal B).  
For all experimental conditions there was a control group providing similarity 
ratings for the stimuli, but without having gone through the categorization task first. 
The control groups were shared between some of the conditions (since the stimuli 
were the same). Accordingly, for the Width Easy, Height Easy, and NLS conditions 
there was a control group of 20 participants, for the Width Difficult and the Height 
Difficult conditions a different control of 20 participants, for the Diagonal A group a 
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different control group of 20 participants, and finally a different group of 20 control 
participants for the Diagonal B condition.  
 
Materials 
We used stimuli that varied along two separable dimensions of variation. 
Figure 2 shows an example of the stimuli for the Width Easy, Height Easy, and NLS 
conditions (note that, even though the stimuli in these conditions are identical, the 
classifications participants were asked to learn differed). We employed yellow 
surface-rendered arrow-like shapes that varied in terms of the width of the arrowhead 
(horizontal dimension) and the length of the arrow (vertical). The smallest arrow’s 
trunk measured 4.5 centimeters (cm) in height and its head measured 3.0 cm wide. 
Twenty-four more stimuli were created by incrementing trunk height and head width 
by 12%. The stimuli employed in the experimental conditions were subsets of this 
original set of stimuli. The shortest arrow trunk in all six conditions was 4.5cm high 
and the narrowest arrow head 3.0cm wide. The tallest arrow trunk was 12.5cm in the 
Width Easy, Height Easy, Diagonal, and NLS conditions and 7.1cm in the Width 
Difficult and Height Difficult conditions. The widest arrow head was 8.3cm in the 
Width Easy, Height Easy, and NLS conditions, 4.7cm in the Width Difficult and 
Height Difficult conditions and 5.3cm in the Diagonal A and Diagonal B conditions.  
-------------------FIGURE 2-------------------- 
 
Procedure  
A standard supervised categorization task was employed. A stimulus was 
presented at the center of a computer screen against a white background, until the 
participant decided whether it belonged to category A or B, at which point he/she 
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received corrective feedback. Participants continued to categorize stimuli until no 
mistakes were made for 32 consecutive trials (i.e., all stimuli shown twice) or for a 
maximum of 256 trials (note that, given enough training, there is evidence that 
participants can learn very hard category structures; McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995). 
Five participants failed this criterion (three in the NLS condition and two in the 
Diagonal A condition) and these participants were not asked to complete the 
similarity part of the study. It is consistent with expectation that, if any participants 
were to fail the learning task, this would happen in the more difficult category 
structures. 
Participants, who completed the categorization task successfully, subsequently 
received the similarity ratings task. In that task, each trial started with a ‘Ready?’ 
prompt at the center of the screen. Two stimuli appeared at the screen center for 
500ms each, one after the other, with an inter-stimulus interval of 500ms. All possible 
16x16=256 stimulus pairs were presented and participants were asked to rate their 
similarity on a 1-9 scale, such that 1 corresponded to ‘very dissimilar’ and 9 to ‘very 
similar’. Participants were encouraged to use the entire scale. Participants in the 
control groups went through the similarity ratings, without having done the 
categorization task first.  
 
Results 
Inclusion criteria 
 We employed two simple checks that the participants were sufficiently 
attentive during the similarity ratings task. Participants were excluded if they did not 
use the whole 1-9 similarity rating scale (specifically, those who used five or fewer 
rating values in total) and if they failed to rate two identical stimuli as most similar 
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(by assigning to them a rating of 7 or higher) more than three times. This procedure 
led to the elimination of 3 participants from the Width Easy group, 3 from the Height 
Easy one, 2 from the Width Difficult one, 1 from the NLS group, 1 from the Diagonal 
B one, and 5 participants from the control groups.  Note that the similarity ratings for 
pairs of identical stimuli were not employed for any purpose, other than to check that 
participants were attending to the task.   
 
Learning Results 
We examined the number of trials required to learn the different category 
structures (trials to criterion) and the number of errors until perfect classification had 
been achieved (Table 1). Both the trials to criterion and the errors varied across 
category structures (F(6,123)=13.83, p<.0005 and F(6,122)=11.13, p<.0005, 
respectively). Note that trials to criterion and errors correlated highly with each other 
(r=.86, p<.0005), so, henceforth, we will just consider trials to criterion. Note also 
that a preliminary assessment revealed no significant difference in learning between 
the Diagonal A, Diagonal B conditions, so we pooled results across the two 
conditions (henceforth, the combined condition will be referred to as the Diagonal 
condition).   
We adopted a planned contrasts approach, regarding the comparisons for 
learning, between the conditions relevant to the two hypotheses of interest. The first 
hypothesis concerns whether more difficult category structures lead to greater 
similarity change and the category structures created for this hypothesis were the 
Width Easy, Difficult ones and the Height Easy, Difficult ones. As expected, a 
contrast comparing learning in the Width Easy and Height Easy category structures 
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against the Width Difficult and Height Difficult ones was significant (t(70)=2.53, 
p=.014; here and elsewhere, all pairwise comparisons were two-tailed).  
 The second hypothesis concerned differences in similarity change, between 
category structures broadly matched in difficulty, but differing in the type of category 
boundary involved. The category structures we intended for this hypothesis were the 
NLS, Diagonal and the hardest one between Width Difficult and Height Difficult (as 
Table 1 shows, the Height Difficult condition was associated with the greatest number 
of trials, though note that the difference with Width Difficult was not statistically 
significant). We compared trials to criterion in the Diagonal condition vs. the Height 
Difficult one (t(57)=3.278, p=.002) and in the Diagonal condition vs. the NLS one 
(t(56)=3.320, p=.002). The first comparison is relevant as it allows us to explore 
similarity change for category structures with a linear boundary, but with (Height 
Difficult) and without (Diagonal) alignment with a dimension of physical variation. 
The second comparison concerns a category structure with a linear boundary 
(Diagonal) vs. one for which a linear boundary is not possible (NLS). The only 
implication for the similarity change analyses from these results is that we need to 
consider learning trials to criterion as a covariate, in the corresponding statistical tests 
for similarity change, for the second hypothesis.  
  
Similarity measures 
We sought to quantify similarity change with two dependent variables, motivated both 
from work on similarity change and theoretical approaches to category structure. 
Within (category) similarity referred to the extent to which the stimuli within the 
different categories in a category structure were perceived to be similar to each other. 
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The definition for between (category) similarity was analogous, but for the fact that 
this concerned stimuli in different categories.  
Within and between similarity variables were computed directly from the 
similarity ratings participants provided, by taking into account all the relevant 
stimulus pairs. For a particular participant, for a particular category structure, within 
similarity would be the average of his/ her similarity ratings for all pairs of stimuli, 
such that both stimuli were in the same category. Between similarity was computed as 
the average of all pairs of stimuli in different categories. Also, within similarity 
change refers to the change in within similarity, as a result of category learning, and 
likewise for between similarity change.  
Control groups of participants provided similarity ratings for the stimuli in 
each category structure condition and this information was used to compute within, 
between similarity values, for each category structure, prior to learning. These within, 
between similarity values were then compared with similarity values from participants 
trained with the corresponding category structures. If the similarity structure of the 
stimuli changes so that it becomes more consistent with the learned categorization, we 
expect within similarity after learning to be increased, relative to the value without 
learning and between similarity after learning to be decreased, relative to the value 
prior to learning (but, in principle, between similarity change is independent of within 
similarity change).  
 
Similarity results  
In this section we employ families of pairwise comparisons. With such families, there 
is a risk of Type 1 error and so we applied the Bonferroni Holm correction for 
significance levels (e.g., Abdi, 2010), as a suitable compromise between the need to 
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control for family-wise Type 1 error, while not inflating Type 2 error and reducing 
power (e.g., see Nakagawa, 2004, and Perneger, 1998, who argued against the use of 
Bonferroni corrections in multiple t-tests). Our reporting strategy for multiple t-tests is 
to report the uncorrected p-value and then state whether this is significant or not, 
according to the Bonferroni Holm correction. 
The category structures were designed so that some were meant to be easier to 
learn than others. A concern was that for intuitive category structures, within 
similarity prior to learning may have been so high that no further changes would be 
possible after learning (and, likewise, the prior between similarity may have been so 
low that further decreases due to learning may have been impossible). We therefore 
conducted single sample t-tests of within similarity values computed from control 
participants, against the highest possible value for within similarity (nine); likewise, 
we conducted single sample t-tests of control between similarity values against the 
lowest possible value for between similarity (one). All the above t-tests were 
(Bonferroni Holm corrected) significant. Regarding within category similarity values, 
the magnitude of all t-tests was greater than 15.60 (degrees of freedom varied between 
18 and 36). Regarding between category similarity values, the magnitude of all t-tests 
was greater than 12.28 (degrees of freedom between 18 and 35). So, we can conclude 
that prior to learning there was ‘room for improvement’, so to say, with respect to 
both within and between similarity values, prior to learning.  
We next consider the two hypotheses for the conditions which may impact on 
similarity change. The first hypothesis was that, in otherwise matched category 
structures, the more difficult ones will lead to greater similarity change. We therefore 
sought to compare similarity change in the Height Easy vs. Height Difficult 
classifications and likewise for the Width Easy vs. the Width Difficult ones, by 
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comparing the similarity values computed from the control participants, with the 
similarity values from corresponding experimental participants. Since some 
experimental conditions shared the same control (as the underlying stimuli were 
identical and it was only the category structure which differed; e.g., Width Easy and 
Width Difficult), the most appropriate statistical approach to the first hypothesis was a 
family of independent samples t-tests between the similarity values computed from 
the control participants and those from the experimental participants (Figure 3; it is 
interesting to explore similarity change for all category structures, not just the ones 
relevant to the first hypothesis, and so the Bonferroni Holm correction was applied to 
a family of comparisons including all category structures).  
Regarding within similarity change, we observed significant differences for 
both the Width Difficult (t(36)=2.72, p=.01, as just noted, all statements of 
significance in multiple comparisons are based on the Bonferroni Holm procedure) 
and Height Difficult conditions (t(38)=2.86, p=.007), but not the Width Easy or the 
Height Easy ones. We take this result as consistent with our first hypothesis, insofar 
that more difficult category structures were more likely to lead to similarity change. 
More generally, within similarity change was observed for poorly separated  category 
structures, whether category boundaries align with a dimension of physical variation 
(Height Difficult, Width Difficult) or not (Diagonal; t(72)=2.79, p=.007) and, finally, 
even in cases when there is no linear category boundary at all (NLS; t(36)=2.73, 
p=.01). Note that within similarity change in all cases was an increase in within 
similarity, as a result of learning, which shows that stimuli within the same categories 
became more similar to each other.  
Regarding between similarity change, there were no reliable differences in 
between similarity ratings with and without learning (all p-values greater than .068, 
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degrees of freedom between 34 and 72). It is clear that the particular set of category 
structures and measures we employed appears better suited for the study of within 
similarity change.  
We next considered the second hypothesis, that is, whether for, categorizations 
broadly matched in overall difficulty, the nature of the category boundary impacted 
on similarity change. We ran a 3x2 between participants ANCOVA, with two 
independent variables. The three-level variable concerned category structure. We 
were interested in comparing similarity change as a result of learning broadly equally 
difficult category structures, with a linear simple boundary (Height Difficult) vs. a 
linear boundary not aligned to one of the dimensions of variations (Diagonal) vs. a 
non-linear category boundary (NLS). Recall, there were significant differences in the 
trials to criterion for some of these category structures, so we employed trial to 
criterion as a covariate (the covariate does not apply to control participants, so to 
control participants we assigned the mean from the corresponding experimental 
conditions). The two-level variable concerned the distinction between the control 
group and the experimental group.  
Regarding within similarity, as expected, the control group vs. experimental 
group factor was highly significant (F(1,144)=20.653, p<.0005), but not the category 
structure factor (F(2,144)=.987, p=.375) or the crucial interaction (F(2,144)=.142, 
p=.867; without the covariate, we obtained p=.865). Regarding between similarity 
change, running the same 3x2 ANCOVA, the category structure factor was significant 
(F(2,144)=14.619, p<.0005), but not the control group vs. experimental group factor 
(F(1,144)=2.914, p=.090) or the interaction (F(2,144)=0.267, p=.766; without the 
covariate, p=.764). Thus, there was no evidence that the nature of the category 
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boundary mattered on these measures, for the Height Difficult, NLS, and Diagonal 
category structures. 
 
--------------------TABLE 1-------------------- 
--------------------FIGURE 3--------------------------- 
 
Discussion 
There has been considerable interest in changes in similarity (or perception) induced 
as a result of categorization, though few studies have attempted a systematic study of 
the factors which make such changes likely (for exceptions see Folstein et al., 2003 or 
Livingston et al., 1998). The overarching question in this research was whether 
category structure is a relevant factor in trying to understand changes in similarity as a 
result of categorization. One hypothesis is that representation (and so presumably 
changes in representation) must be partly driven by cognitive demands on which 
categories are easier vs. more difficult to learn. A second hypothesis concerned the 
nature of the category boundary (aligned to a dimension of physical variation vs. 
diagonal vs. NLS), for category structures broadly equally difficult.  
 Our approach was to specify a range of category structures, which varied in 
potentially relevant ways. Two category structures were defined in terms of a 
category boundary along one dimension of variation, but one was expected to be 
easier to learn than the other (Height Easy, Height Difficult). Two further category 
structures were defined in the same way, but with a category boundary defined along 
the other dimension (Width Easy, Width Difficult). Note that any expectations 
regarding category difficulty were (partly) confirmed experimentally. We also created 
an NLS category structure, since in such a case there are interesting, conflicting 
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expectations regarding the extent to which similarity changes as a result of 
categorization might take place (Blair & Homa, 2003; Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1986). Finally, we included a category structure with a diagonal category boundary, to 
contrast any findings regarding similarity change with those from category structures 
in which the category boundary was aligned with dimensions of physical variation. 
Note that ‘category structure’ is not a methods variable which can be counterbalanced 
in the way methods variables are manipulated in e.g. learning or attention 
experiments. The inclusion of each additional category structure requires an 
additional between participants’ conditions with several participants (20 participants 
per condition, in the present study). Indeed, other research involving a range of 
category structures involved restrictions analogous to those in the present study 
(Pothos et al., 2011; Shepard et al., 1961).  
 The first hypothesis was that more difficult category structures would lead to 
greater similarity change. For the matched Height Easy, Difficult and the matched 
Width Easy, Difficult category structures, we did observe that within similarity 
change was significantly greater (i.e., stimuli in the same categories becoming more 
similar) for more difficult, compared to easier, category structures. Interestingly, this 
finding resonates with evidence from the animal cognition literature, that similarity 
change may be greater with harder learning tasks (cf. Delamater, 1998, if one assumes 
that learning to distinguish stimuli from the same modality is harder than 
distinguishing stimuli from different modalities). We also tried to motivate the idea 
that the separateness of the clusters in a category structure may impact on whether 
within or between similarity change was more pronounced (cf. Chin-Parker & Ross, 
2004; Markman & Ross, 2003), but there was no support for these suggestions.  
 The second hypothesis we examined concerned whether, for category structures 
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of broadly equivalent difficulty, other category structure characteristics might impact 
on the degree of similarity change. We compared similarity change for difficult 
category structures with a linear category boundary aligned to a dimension of 
variation (Height Difficult condition) vs. a more complex linear category boundary 
(Diagonal condition) vs. a non-linear category boundary (NLS condition). However, 
there was no evidence that the nature of the category boundary impacted on similarity 
change, either for within similarity change or between similarity change.  
 We highlight our inability to detect between similarity change, in apparent 
contrast with previous work, such as Goldstone’s (1994; cf. Harnad, 1987, but even 
work with non-humans, e.g., Delamater, 1998). The main difference of the present 
work with previous such work concerns our use of measures of similarity change, 
which were directly defined against the relevant category structure. This meant that 
similarity change was measured as an average across several stimulus pairs, while in 
previous research similarity change was typically examined at the level of individual 
stimulus pairs (e.g., Goldstone, 1994). Moreover, we employed readily 
distinguishable stimuli, with the view to detect similarity change as changes in 
similarity ratings, rather than changes in confusability. Finally, Goldstone (1994) and 
related studies employed stimuli that uniformly spanned the relevant region of 
similarity space, so that there were no naturally occurring clusters (and so there was 
perhaps more room for similarity to change, in a way consistent with a learned 
categorization). We had to implement other, less major, changes, so as to shift the 
research focus away from similarity measures on individual pairs and towards 
similarity measures directly defined on the relevant category structures. We think 
such a shift is theoretically important and justifies this initial difficulty in 
understanding the empirical impact of the various methods changes.  
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 In addressing the current research questions, we opted against using a within-
participant design, whereby similarity ratings would be collected prior and post 
category learning. There are two reasons for doing so. First, the repetitive nature of 
similarity ratings makes it tricky to expect participants to provide too many such 
ratings (e.g., both prior and post classification) in the same experimental session. 
Second, extended prior exposure to the stimuli (e.g., if similarity ratings are provided 
prior to category learning) may lead to confounds, which would be difficult to control. 
For example, extended exposure may lead to unsupervised categorization of the 
stimuli (which could be associated with similarity change; Gureckis & Goldstone, 
2008) or other changes in representation.  
 Relatedly, a reasonable alternative approach for collecting control similarity 
information would be to pre-expose the stimuli to control participants, for a number of 
trials equivalent to the learning trials for the corresponding categorization. Arguably, 
such a control would exactly tell us whether exposure to the stimuli vs. learning as 
such is the critical factor in determining similarity change. The problem with such a 
control is that it would be extremely difficult to dissociate exposure from any kind of 
learning, which may occur with prolonged engagement with the stimuli. For example, 
as just noted, with increased exposure, unsupervised categorization of the stimuli 
might occur, which could in turn produce some similarity change. How could we 
prevent unsupervised categorization of the stimuli? Existing theoretical insights do 
not allow any prescriptions. Overall, it is fair to say that the merits and demerits of 
different methods for collecting similarity information are fairly well-balanced and no 
one procedure is obviously better than another. 
 Such issues could be clarified with greater confidence, if we were able to 
specify with more precision the mechanisms which lead to similarity change. 
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Following from the relevant discussion in the introduction, one could speculate that 
increased category difficulty forces participants to look harder for commonalities 
between the members of each category. It is currently difficult to offer additional 
insight, but we can preclude two possibilities regarding the underlying mechanisms. 
First, the kind of attentional mechanisms postulated in models of categorizations, such 
as exemplar or prototype theory (e.g., Nosofsky, 1984) are unlikely to be the whole 
story, since they involve a uniform attentional change, whereas we observed within 
similarity change, without concomitant between change (though it is possible that a 
combination of changes in the attentional parameters and the sensitivity parameter 
may work). Second, it is unlikely that all our results could be explained by some 
process involving explicit hypothesis testing (cf. Ashby et al., 1998), since some of 
the category structures for which we did observe within similarity change were 
complex enough to preclude explicit hypotheses (e.g., the Diagonal or the NLS 
category structures). Overall, models of categorization have emphasized 
computational principles, rather than process, and clearly further work is needed in 
this direction.  
 To sum up, our results enable some specific insights regarding the 
circumstances which are more likely to lead to similarity change. We hope this work 
will further incentivize research on this novel and important aspect of representation 
and category learning.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Trials to criterion and errors to criterion.  
 
Category structure Trials to criterion 
(mean, SD) 
Errors 
(mean, SD) 
Width Easy 45.41, 32.69 7.25, 14.68 
Width Diff 71.00, 49.66 5.61, 4.92 
Height Easy 71.47, 32.55 15.00, 13.40 
Height Diff 101.35, 60.26 21.10, 21.07 
NLS 102.58, 50.42 34.58, 22.89 
Diagonal 154.59, 58.44 33.97, 14.93 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. The six category structures employed in the study.  
 
Figure 2. Illustration of an example of the stimuli employed in the current study, 
reduced in size.  
 
Figure 3. The comparison concerning within and between similarity, prior and post 
learning, for the different category structures. Error bars represent one standard error 
of the mean. Stars mark significant results.  
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